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What does Cognitariat Mean?  







FRANCO BERARDI (BIFO) 
 	  In	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   notions	   of	   cognitive	   labour	   and	   cognitariat,	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  analyse	  not	  only	  the	  transformations	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  the	  work	  process	  but	  also	  what	  is	  happening	  in	  the	  psychic	  and	  desiring	  dimension	  of	  post-­‐industrial	  society.	  What	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  social	  definition	  of	  cognitive	  labour	  is	  the	  body,	  sexuality,	  perishable	  physicality	  and	  the	  unconscious.	  Cognitariat	   is	  the	  social	  corporeality	  of	  cognitive	  labour.	  In	  his	  most	  celebrated	  book	   Cyberculture,	   Pierre	   Lévy	   proposes	   the	   notion	   of	   collective	   intelligence.1	   But	   the	   social	  existence	  of	  cognitive	  workers	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  intelligence:	  in	  their	  existential	  concreteness,	  the	   cognitarians	   are	   also	   body,	   in	   other	   words	   nerves	   that	   stiffen	   in	   the	   constant	   strain	   of	  attention,	   eyes	   that	   get	   tired	   staring	   at	   a	   screen.	   Collective	   intelligence	   neither	   reduces	   nor	  resolves	  the	  social	  existence	  of	  the	  bodies	  that	  produce	  this	  intelligence,	  the	  concrete	  bodies	  of	  the	  male	  and	  female	  cognitarians.	  
—DIGITAL LABOUR AND ABSTRACTION What	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  work	  today?	  Work	  is	  tending	  to	  assume	  a	  uniform	  physical	  character:	  we	  sit	  down	  in	  front	  of	  a	  screen,	  move	  our	  fingers	  on	  the	  keyboard	  and	  type.	  But	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  work	  is	   a	   lot	   more	   diversified	   in	   the	   contents	   it	   elaborates.	   The	   architect,	   the	   travel	   agent,	   the	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programmer	  and	  the	  lawyer	  carry	  out	  the	  same	  physical	  gestures,	  but	  could	  never	  exchange	  jobs	  because	   each	  of	   them	  performs	   a	   specific,	   local	   task,	   one	   that	   is	   not	   communicable	   to	   someone	  who	  has	  not	  followed	  their	  particular	  educational	  cursus	  or	  to	  someone	  who	  is	  not	  familiar	  with	  that	  complex	  content	  of	  knowledges.	  Mechanical	  industrial	  labour	  was	  characterised	  by	  the	  traits	  of	  substantial	  interchangeability	  and	  depersonalisation	  and	  as	  a	  consequence	  was	  perceived	  as	  something	  extraneous,	  a	  task	  that	  was	  performed	  solely	  because	  one	  received	  a	  salary	  in	  exchange.	  Dependent	  salaried	  work	  was	  a	  pure	  service	  of	  time.	  Digital	  technologies	  open	  up	  an	  entirely	  new	  vista	  for	  work.	  In	  the	  first	  place,	  they	  modify	  the	  relationship	   between	   conception	   and	   execution,	   then	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   intellectual	  content	  of	  work	  and	  its	  manual	  execution.	  Manual	  labour	  tends	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  by	  automatically	  controlled	  machine-­‐assemblages,	  while	   the	   innovative	   labour	   that	   produces	   the	   greater	   part	   of	  value	   is	   to	   be	   found	   in	   cognitive	   labour.	   The	  material	   to	   be	   transformed	   is	   simulated	  by	  digital	  sequences.	  The	  content	  of	   labour	  becomes	  mental,	  but	  at	   the	  same	  time	  the	   limits	  of	  productive	  work	   become	   uncertain.	   The	   very	   notion	   of	   productivity	   becomes	   imprecise:	   the	   relationship	  between	  time	  and	  the	  quantity	  of	  value	  produced	  becomes	  difficult	  to	  stabilise,	  because	  not	  all	  the	  hours	  of	  a	  cognitive	  labourer	  are	  equal	  in	  terms	  of	  productivity.	  The	  Marxian	   notion	   of	   abstract	   labour	   needs	   to	   be	   redefined.	  What	   does	   ‘abstract	   labour’	  mean	   in	   the	   language	   of	   Marx?	   It	   signifies	   an	   extortion	   of	   time,	   without	   regard	   for	   its	   quality,	  without	   relation	   to	   the	   specific	   and	   concrete	   utility	   of	   the	   objects	   it	   creates.	   Industrial	   labour	  tended	  towards	  abstraction	  because	  its	  concrete	  utility	  was	  entirely	  irrelevant	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  function	  of	  economic	  valorisation.	  Can	  we	  say	  that	  this	  progressive	  reduction	  to	  abstraction	  continues	  to	  operate	  in	  the	  era	  of	  infoproduction?	  In	  a	  certain	  sense	  yes;	  indeed,	  in	  a	  certain	  sense	  we	  can	  say	  that	  this	  tendency	  is	  amplified	  to	  the	  highest	  degree,	  because	  every	  residue	  of	  materiality	  and	  concreteness	  disappears	  from	   the	   labouring	   operation,	   and	   only	   the	   symbolic	   abstractions	   remain,	   bits,	   digits	   and	  differences	  of	  information,	  on	  which	  productive	  activity	  acts.	  We	  can	  say	  that	  the	  digitalisation	  of	  the	  work	  process	  has	  made	  all	  kinds	  of	  work	  equal	  from	  the	  physical	  and	  ergonomic	  point	  of	  view.	  We	  all	  do	  the	  same	  thing:	  we	  sit	  down	  in	  front	  of	  a	  screen	  and	  tap	  on	  the	  keys	  of	  a	  keyboard,	  and	  the	  automatic	  machines	   transform	  our	  activity	   into	  a	   television	   script,	   a	   surgical	  operation	  or	  a	  car.	   From	   a	   physical	   point	   of	   view	   there	   is	   no	   difference	   between	   a	   travel	   agent,	   a	   machine	  operator	   in	   the	   petrochemical	   sector,	   or	   a	   detective	   novelist,	   when	   they	   are	   carrying	   out	   their	  work.	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And	  yet	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  work	  has	  become	  part	  of	  a	  mental	  process,	  the	  elaboration	  of	  signs	  dense	  with	  knowledge.	   It	  has	  become	  a	   lot	  more	  specific,	  a	   lot	  more	  specialised:	   the	   lawyer	  and	  the	  architect,	  the	  IT	  technician	  and	  the	  supermarket	  employee,	  are	  positioned	  in	  front	  of	  the	  same	  screen	  and	  tap	  on	  the	  same	  keys,	  but	  the	  one	  could	  never	  take	  the	  position	  of	  the	  other	  because	  the	  content	  of	  their	  elaborative	  activity	  is	  irreducibly	  different	  and	  untranslatable.	  A	   chemical	   worker	   and	   a	   metal	   mechanics	   worker	   are	   engaged	   in	   labour	   that	   is	   totally	  different	   from	   the	   physical	   point	   of	   view,	   but	   a	   metal	   mechanics	   worker	   can	   acquire	   the	  operational	   knowledge	   for	   performing	   the	   job	   of	   the	   chemical	   worker	   in	   a	   few	   days,	   and	   vice	  versa.	  The	  more	   industrial	   labour	   is	  simplified,	   the	  more	   interchangeable	   it	  becomes.	   In	   front	  of	  the	   computer	  and	  connected	   to	   the	   same	  universal	  machine	  of	   elaboration	  and	  communication,	  human	  terminals	  all	  carry	  out	  the	  same	  physical	  movements,	  but	  the	  simpler	  their	  work	  becomes	  from	  the	  physical	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  less	  interchangeable	  become	  their	  bodies	  of	  knowledge,	  their	  capacities	  and	  their	  services.	  Digitalised	   labour	  manipulates	  absolutely	  abstract	   signs,	  but	   its	   recombinant	   functioning	   is	  all	  the	  more	  specific,	  all	  the	  more	  personalised	  and	  therefore	  less	  and	  less	  interchangeable.	  As	  a	  consequence,	   high	   tech	   workers	   tend	   to	   consider	   their	   work	   as	   the	   most	   important,	   most	  singularised	  and	  most	  personalised	  part	  of	  their	  life—the	  exact	  opposite	  of	  the	  industrial	  worker’s	  situation,	  for	  whom	  the	  eight	  hours	  of	  salaried	  service	  were	  a	  sort	  of	  temporary	  death	  from	  which	  one	  awoke	  only	  when	  the	  stop-­‐work	  siren	  went	  off.	  
—ENTERPRISE AND DESIRE Only	  if	  we	  take	  this	  into	  account	  can	  we	  explain	  why,	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  disaffection	  and	  absenteeism	  have	   become	   totally	  marginal	   phenomena,	  whereas	   they	  were	   endemic	   in	   the	   late	  industrial	  period.	  The	  studies	  carried	  out	  by	  Juliet	  Schorr	  (The	  Overworked	  American)	  show	  that	  in	  the	  1980s	  (and	  even	  more	  so	  in	  the	  1990s)	  the	  average	  working	  time	  increased	  considerably.	  On	  average,	   every	  worker	   in	   the	   USA	   dedicated	   148	  more	   hours	   to	   work	   in	   1996	   than	   his	   or	   her	  colleague	  in	  1973.	  The	  percentage	  of	  people	  who	  work	  more	  than	  49	  hours	  a	  week	  increased	  from	  13	  per	  cent	  in	  1976	  to	  almost	  19	  per	  cent	  in	  1998	  according	  to	  the	  US	  Bureau	  of	  Labour	  Statistics.	  As	  for	  managers,	  the	  percentage	  went	  up	  from	  40	  to	  45	  per	  cent.2	  How	  can	  the	  conversion	  of	  workers	  from	  disaffection	  to	  adherence	  be	  explained?	  Certainly	  it	  can	   be	   explained	   by	   the	   political	   defeat	   that	   the	   working	   class	   suffered	   after	   the	   end	   of	   the	  seventies—a	   consequence	   of	   technological	   restructuring,	   the	   resulting	   unemployment	   and	   the	  violent	   repression	   of	   working	   class	   avant-­‐gardes.	   But	   this	   is	   not	   enough.	   In	   order	   to	   fully	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understand	   the	   psychosocial	   change	   of	   attitude	   towards	  work,	   we	   need	   to	   take	   into	   account	   a	  decisive	  cultural	  mutation	  that	  is	  linked	  with	  the	  displacement	  of	  the	  social	  centre	  of	  gravity	  from	  the	  sphere	  of	  industrial	  labour	  to	  the	  sphere	  of	  cognitive	  labour.	  Unlike	  the	  industrial	  labourer,	  the	  cognitive	  labourer	  considers	  work	  as	  the	  most	  important	  part	  of	  his	  or	  her	  life,	  no	  longer	  opposes	  the	  lengthening	  of	  the	  working	  day,	  and	  indeed	  tends	  to	  lengthen	  work-­‐time	   of	   his	   or	   her	   own	   accord.	   And	   this	   happens	   for	   diverse	   reasons:	   above	   all,	  over	  the	  last	  decades	  the	  urban	  social	  community	  has	  become	  progressively	  less	  interesting	  and	  has	   been	   reduced	   to	   a	   dead	  wrapping	   of	   relations	  without	   humanity	   or	   pleasure.	   Sexuality	   and	  conviviality	  have	  been	  progressively	   transformed	   into	  standardised,	   regulated	  mechanisms,	  and	  the	  singular	  pleasure	  of	  the	  body	  has	  been	  progressively	  replaced	  by	  the	  anxiety-­‐ridden	  need	  for	  identity.	  As	  Mike	  Davies	  shows	  in	  books	  such	  as	  City	  of	  Quartz	  and	  Ecology	  of	  Fear,	  the	  quality	  of	  existence	  has	  deteriorated	  from	  the	  affective	  and	  psychical	  point	  of	  view	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  rarefaction	  of	  community	  ties	  and	  their	  security-­‐driven	  sterilisation.3	  It	  seems	  that	  in	  human	  relations,	  in	  daily	  life,	  in	  affective	  communication,	  one	  finds	  less	  and	  less	  pleasure	  and	  less	  and	  less	  reassurance.	  A	  consequence	  of	  this	  dis-­‐eroticisation	  of	  daily	  life	  is	  the	  investment	  of	  desire	  in	  work,	  understood	  as	  the	  sole	  space	  of	  narcissistic	  reaffirmation	  for	  an	  individuality	  used	  to	  seeing	  the	  other	  according	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  competition,	  that	  is,	  as	  a	  danger,	  an	  impoverishment,	  a	  limitation,	  rather	  than	  a	  source	  of	  experience,	  pleasure	  and	  enrichment.	  The	  effect	  that	  has	  taken	  hold	  of	  daily	  life	  during	  the	  last	  decades	  is	  that	  of	  a	  generalised	  de-­‐solidarisation.	  The	  imperative	  of	  competition	  has	  become	  dominant	  in	  work,	  communication	  and	  culture,	   through	  a	  systematic	   transformation	  of	   the	  other	   into	  a	  competitor	  and	   thus	  an	  enemy.	  The	  principle	  of	  war	  has	  taken	  the	  commanding	  position	   in	  social	   life,	   in	  every	   instance	  of	  daily	  life	   and	   in	   every	   aspect	   of	   relationships.	   What	   is	   also	   decisive	   is	   the	   drastic	   worsening	   of	   the	  conditions	  of	  social	  protection	  provoked	  by	  twenty	  years	  of	  deregulation	  and	  dismantling	  of	  the	  public	  structures	  of	  assistance.	  The	  more	  time	  we	  dedicate	  to	  acquiring	  the	  means	  of	  consumption,	  the	  less	  time	  remains	  for	  us	  to	  enjoy	  the	  actual	  world.	  The	  more	  we	  invest	  our	  nervous	  energies	  in	  acquiring	  the	  power	  to	  acquire,	   the	   less	   we	   can	   invest	   them	   in	   enjoyment.	   It	   is	   around	   this	   problem—completely	  neglected	  by	  economic	  discourse—that	  the	  question	  of	  happiness	  and	  unhappiness	  is	  played	  out	  in	  hypercapitalist	  society.	  In	  order	  to	  have	  more	  economic	  power	  (more	  money,	  more	  credit),	  we	  need	  to	  dedicate	  more	  and	  more	  time	  to	  socially	  ratified	  work.	  But	  this	  means	  we	  have	  to	  reduce	  the	  time	  of	  enjoyment	  and	  of	  experience;	  in	  short,	  we	  have	  to	  reduce	  life.	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Wealth	  defined	  as	  enjoyment	  diminishes	  in	  proportion	  to	  the	  increase	  of	  wealth	  as	  economic	  accumulation,	   for	   the	   simple	   reason	   that	  mental	   time	   is	   dedicated	   to	   accumulating	   rather	   than	  enjoying.	  Conversely	  wealth	  understood	  as	  economic	  accumulation	  increases	  when	  the	  dispersed	  pleasure	  of	  enjoyment	  is	  reduced.	  And	  the	  two	  possibilities	  conspire	  to	  produce	  the	  same	  effect:	  the	   expansion	   of	   the	   economic	   sphere	   coincides	   with	   a	   reduction	   of	   the	   erotic	   sphere.	   When	  things,	   bodies	   and	   signs	   enter	   into	   and	  become	  part	   of	   the	   semiotic	  model	   of	   the	   economy,	   the	  experience	   of	   wealth	   can	   only	   be	   actualised	   in	   a	   mediated,	   reflexive,	   deferred	   way.	  Wealth	   no	  longer	  consists	   in	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  the	  time	  of	  things,	  bodies	  and	  signs,	  but	  the	  accelerated	  and	  expansive	  production	  of	  their	  lack,	  transformed	  into	  an	  exchange	  value,	  transformed	  into	  anxiety.	  At	  this	  point	  it	  becomes	  possible	  to	  understand	  why	  work	  has	  acquired	  a	  central	  position	  in	  social	  affectivity:	  the	  liberal	  offensive	  has	  so	  devastated	  sociality	  that	  workers	  are	  obliged	  to	  accept	  the	  primordial	  bribe—work	  whenever	  and	  as	  much	  as	  the	  boss	  wants	  or	  sink	  into	  poverty.	  Moreover,	  the	   impoverishment	   of	   the	   social	   dimension	   and	   the	   dis-­‐eroticisation	   of	   experience	   have	  made	  daily	   life	   so	   sad	   that	   work	   ends	   up	   seeming	   like	   the	   only	   tolerable	   condition.	   We	   reconcile	  ourselves	  with	  work	  because	  economic	  survival	  is	  becoming	  more	  difficult	  and	  metropolitan	  life	  is	  becoming	  so	  sad	  that	  we	  might	  as	  well	  exchange	  it	  for	  money.	  
—PANIC-DEPRESSIVE SYNDROME AND COMPETITION In	  his	  book	  called	  La	  fatigue	  d’être	  soi	   [The	  Fatigue	  of	  Being	  Oneself],	  Alain	  Ehrenberg	  describes	  depression	   as	   a	   pathology	   with	   a	   strong	   social	   content,	   linked	   in	   particular	   to	   a	   situation	  characterised	  by	  competitiveness.	  Depression	  began	  to	  assert	  itself	  when	  the	  disciplinary	  model	  of	  managing	  behaviour,	  the	  rules	  of	  authority	  and	  the	  respect	  for	  taboos	  that	  assigned	  a	  destiny	  to	  social	  classes	  and	  sexes,	  gave	  way	  to	  norms	  that	  incite	  everyone	  to	  individual	  initiative,	  exhorting	  them	  to	  become	  themselves.	  Because	  of	  this	  new	  normativity,	  the	  entire	  responsibility	  for	  our	  lives	  is	  located	  inside	  each	  of	  us.	  Depression	  thus	  presents	  itself	  as	  a	  sickness	  of	  responsibility	  in	  which	  the	  feeling	  of	  insufficiency	  dominates.	  The	  depressive	  is	  not	  up	  to	  the	  mark,	  is	  tired	  of	  having	  to	  become	  his	  or	  herself.4	  Depression	   is	   intimately	   linked	   to	   the	   ideology	   of	   self-­‐fulfilment	   and	   the	   happiness	   imperative.	  And	   depression	   is	   also	   a	   way	   of	   identifying,	   in	   the	   language	   of	   psychopathology,	   a	   kind	   of	  behaviour	  that	  wasn’t	  clearly	  identifiable	  as	  pathological	  outside	  of	  the	  competitive,	  productivist	  and	  individualistic	  context.	  According	  to	  Ehrenberg:	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Depression	  enters	  into	  a	  problematic	  where	  what	  dominates	  is	  not	  so	  much	  emotional	  pain	  as	  inhibition,	  slowing	  down	  and	  asthenia:	  the	  ancient	  sad	  passion	  is	  transformed	  into	  an	  obstacle	  to	  action	  in	  a	  context	  where	  individual	  initiative	  becomes	  the	  measure	  of	  the	  person.5	  Competitiveness	   involves	  a	  high-­‐risk	  narcissistic	   stimulation	  because	  naturally,	   in	  a	  competitive	  situation	  (like	  that	  of	  the	  capitalist	  economy	  in	  general,	  but	  in	  a	  particularly	  accentuated	  way,	  like	  that	  of	  the	  new	  economy),	  the	  contenders	  are	  many	  and	  the	  elect	  are	  few,	  while	  the	  social	  norm	  doesn’t	  recognise	  the	  possibility	  of	  failure	  since	  this	  is	  identified	  as	  a	  psychopathological	  category.	  There	  is	  no	  competition	  without	  defeat,	  without	  failure,	  but	  the	  social	  norm	  cannot	  recognise	  the	  normality	   of	   failure	  without	   putting	   into	  doubt	   its	   ideological	   foundations,	  without	   putting	   into	  doubt	  its	  economic	  efficiency.	  The	  use	  of	  psychostimulant	  or	  anti-­‐depressive	   substances	   is	  naturally	   the	  other	   face	  of	   the	  new	  economy.	  How	  many	  workers	  of	  the	  new	  economy	  survive	  without	  Prozac,	  without	  Zoloft	  or	  without	   cocaine?	   The	   habituation	   to	   psychotropic	   substances,	   those	   that	   can	   be	   bought	   in	   a	  pharmacy	   and	   those	   that	   can	   be	   bought	   on	   the	   black	   market,	   is	   a	   structural	   element	   of	   the	  psychopathogenic	  economy.	  When	  the	  fundamental	  psychological	  imperative	  of	  social	  interaction	  is	   that	   of	   economic	   competition,	   the	   conditions	   of	   mass	   depression	   are	   being	   created.	   This	   is	  effectively	  what	  is	  happening	  before	  our	  very	  eyes.	  Social	  psychologists	  observe	   that	  panic	  and	  depression	  have	  become	  endemic	  over	   the	   last	  few	  decades.	  Panic	  is	  a	  syndrome	  that	  psychologists	  know	  little	  about	  because	  it	  seems	  that	  in	  the	  past	  crises	  of	  this	  sort	  were	  quite	  rare.	  The	  panic	  syndrome	  has	  only	  recently	  been	  diagnosed	  as	  a	  specific	  phenomenon	  and	  it	  is	  with	  great	  difficulty	  that	  its	  physical	  and	  psychic	  causes	  are	  being	  identified.	   It	   is	  with	  even	  greater	  difficulty	   that	  an	  adequate	   therapy	   for	   this	   syndrome	   is	  being	  identified.	   I	   don’t	   claim	   to	   provide	   an	   explanation,	   much	   less	   a	   solution,	   for	   the	   pathological	  problem	   represented	   by	   this	   syndrome.	   I	   restrict	   myself	   to	   a	   few	   reflections	   on	   what	   panic	  signifies.	  Panic	  is	  the	  feeling	  we	  experience	  when,	  confronted	  with	  the	  infinity	  of	  nature,	  we	  feel	  overwhelmed,	  incapable	  of	  accepting	  into	  our	  consciousness	  the	  infinite	  array	  of	  stimuli	  that	  the	  world	  arouses	  in	  us.	  The	  etymology,	   in	  effect,	  comes	  from	  the	  Greek	  word	  signifying	   ‘everything	  that	  exists’	  (pan),	  and	  the	  divinity	  who	  went	  by	  this	  name	  made	  his	  presence	  felt	  as	  the	  bearer	  of	  a	  sublime	   madness,	   as	   James	   Hillman	   writes	   in	   his	   ‘Essay	   on	   Pan’.6	   But	   in	   the	   social	   context	   of	  competitive	  society,	  where	  all	  energies	  are	  mobilised	  towards	  a	  position	  of	  supremacy,	  and	  in	  the	  technological	   context	   of	   constant	   acceleration	   of	   the	   rhythms	   of	   the	   global	   machine,	   panic	  becomes	   a	   social	   effect	   of	   the	   constant	   expansion	   of	   cyberspace	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   limited	  performance	  capacities	  of	  the	  individual	  brain	  and	  with	  respect	  to	  cybertime.	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The	   infinite	   vastness	  of	   the	   infosphere	   surpasses	   the	  performance	   capacities	   of	   the	  human	  organism	  as	  much	  as	   sublime	  nature	   surpasses	   the	  Greek	  man’s	   capacities	   for	   feeling	  when	   the	  god	  Pan	  appears	  on	  the	  horizon.	  The	  infinite	  speed	  of	  expansion	  of	  cyberspace,	  the	  infinite	  speed	  of	  exposure	  to	  signals	  that	  the	  organism	  perceives	  as	  vital	  to	  survival,	  subjects	  it	  to	  a	  perceptive,	  cognitive	   and	   psychic	   stress	   that	   culminates	   in	   a	   dangerous	   acceleration	   of	   all	   vital	   functions,	  breathing	  and	  the	  heart	  beat,	  to	  the	  point	  of	  collapse.	  Thus	   what	   is	   at	   stake	   here	   is	   not	   an	   individual	   psychopathology	   but	   the	   individual	  manifestation	  of	  a	  widespread	  social	  psychopathology.	  —	  Translated	  by	  Melinda	  Cooper.	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